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Master Copies, Unique Copies and Volitional Conduct:  Cartoon 





As technology advances, new types of devices and increasing compatibility of 
data formats make it possible to use files previously accessible on only one or two 
devices.  For example, a person might wish to access a business file (formerly 
stored on a work computer or perhaps even in a file cabinet at the office) from her 
smart phone.  Similarly, another might wish to access his MP3 collection (stored on 
an iPod or personal computer) from his work computer.  Such technological 
progress has paved the way for innovative digital, cable and Internet services that 
enable users to enjoy copyrighted content in new ways:  from time-shifting via 
VCRs1 to place-shifting via new TV devices;2 from instantly purchasing a movie 
through video on demand to watching a live stream of sports coverage on the 
Internet.  One type of service that has recently proliferated is the digital storage 
locker—also known as the cyber locker.3  Digital storage lockers enable users to 
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 1. Time-shifting is watching a television show at a later hour than its original broadcast.  See 2 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8B.01[B] (Matthew Bender rev. 
ed. 2012) (discussing time-shifting and the landmark case Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which held that time-shifting for private use is fair use). 
 2. Place-shifting is a service in which a device set by the provider receives and records 
television program broadcasts in one country and transmits the programs to its customers via the 
Internet, so that the customers can watch them from anywhere in the world.  See Naoya Isoda, Copyright 
Infringement Liability of Placeshifting Services in the United States and Japan, 7 WASH. U. J.L. TECH. 
& ARTS 149, 153 (2011).  Currently, U.S. place-shifting providers include Cablevision, SageTV, Orb 
Networks and Sony.  Id. at 155.  The term “space-shifting” was initially adopted by providers of file 
sharing services to favorably compare their services to that of time-shifting, which was protected by fair 
use.  Id. at 155–56.  Arguing that space-shifting was also fair use, such service providers claimed that a 
“person who owns a copyrighted compact disc who then copies the content to a digital file does not 
engage in infringement.  Instead, that person is merely shifting material that she already owns from one 
‘space’ to another.” See  Dominic H. Rivers, Note, Paying for Cable in Boston, Watching It on a Laptop 
in L.A.:  Does Slingbox Violate Federal Copyright Laws?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 192 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer Martinez, Policing the Digital Storage Landscape, POLITICO (Sept. 21, 
2011, 10:41 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/64053.html (describing cyber lockers as 
the next “frontier” for storing movies, music and personal files on the Internet).  While cyber lockers are 
often used for legitimate purposes, they are also frequently used by consumers to share copyrighted 
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upload content to a virtual locker located on a centralized server and access that 
content from virtually anywhere with an Internet connection. 
Take, for example, the music services MP3.com and MP3tunes.com.  A 
precursor to today’s cyber lockers, MP3.com was created during a time when most 
consumers were still listening to music on CDs.4  MP3.com founder Michael 
Robertson had the clever idea of creating a service that offered users songs in MP3 
format from CDs they already owned.5  The company purchased tens of thousands 
of popular CDs and—without seeking authorization from the record labels—
converted them to MP3 format through the use of the new MP3 technology.6  
MP3.com offered its subscribers online access to listen to songs in MP3 format if 
they could prove they already owned the same song on a CD.7  Although MP3.com 
portrayed its service as the “functional equivalent” of storing its users’ CDs, 
subscribers were, in fact, listening to the converted copies made from the 
company’s physical CD collection.8 
About five years later, Robertson tried his hand at another digital storage locker 
for music with MP3tunes.com.9  Like most cyber locker services today, 
MP3tunes.com allowed users to upload any MP3 files to the site’s central server 
and play or download them again from any computer with an Internet connection.10  
Unlike MP3.com, MP3tunes users themselves provided the content they sought to 
access later, either from music files on their hard drive or, through the use of the 
MP3tunes-owned Sideload website and software, by searching for free music files 
on the Internet.11 
Both MP3.com and MP3tunes were hit with copyright infringement lawsuits.12  
One site was shut down, but the other largely escaped liability (for the most part) in 
what was described as a legal victory.13  Whereas MP3.com was held directly liable 
 
content illegally.  Id.; see also Ernesto, MPAA Lashes out Against Rogue Cyberlockers, TORRENTFREAK 
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-lashes-out-against-rogue-cyberlockers-111101/.  Cyber 
locker providers include Rapidshare, Megaupload, Hotfile, YouSendIt, Bayfiles (from the creators of 
Pirate Bay) and DropBox, among others. 
 4. The decision in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000), was handed down in 2000—more than a year before the first iPod was unveiled.  See Benj 
Edwards, The Birth of the iPod, MACWORLD (Oct. 23, 2011, 6:00 AM) http://www.macworld.com/ 
article/1163181/the_birth_of_the_ipod.html. 
 5. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  Technically, however, subscribers needed to prove only that they had access to a CD with 
the same song; even if the CD was borrowed from a friend, it would not have mattered. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 CIV. 9931 WHP, 2011 WL 3667335 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011), amended and superseded by 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 10. Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
 11. Id. at 633–34. 
 12. For the related court opinions, see supra notes 4 and 9. 
 13. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Record Labels Get Hollow Victory in MP3tunes Infringement 
Case, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/08/record-labels-get-hollow-victory-in-mp3tunes-infringement- case.ars?utm_source= 
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+arstechnica/index+(Ars+Technica+-+Featured 
+Content) (“If Judge William Pauley’s reasoning is confirmed on appeal, it will put music locker 
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for copyright infringement, two factors essentially protected MP3tunes from 
liability:  the availability of a safe harbor defense under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,14 and the reasoning in an influential Second Circuit opinion from 
2008, Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.15 
The advent of cloud computing, in which a user’s files and data are stored on a 
central server and are accessible from just about everywhere, has raised new 
concerns about privacy,16 blurred the line between the office and the home, and 
rendered data storage efficient in an unprecedented way.  Cloud computing has also 
proven a puzzle to copyright law, requiring a reevaluation of some questions 
integral to copyright law:  When is a performance public?  Who makes a copy 
when a system is completely automated?  Courts resolving copyright disputes 
relating to a variety of digital, cable and Internet services have attempted to answer 
these questions, and in doing so, they have largely shaped the legal discourse about 
copyright infringement and cyber lockers. 
In particular, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Cartoon Network has set the stage 
for cyber locker companies to avoid copyright liability for the infringement 
committed by its users.  In Cartoon Network, plaintiffs, who held copyrights to 
numerous television programs and movies, brought suit against Cablevision, an 
operator of cable television systems, on the grounds that Cablevision’s proposed 
offering of a new remote storage digital video recorder (“DVR” or “RS-DVR”) 
would directly infringe their exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly perform 
their works.17  The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and 
enjoined Cablevision from operating the DVR system without licenses from 
content providers.18  The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Cablevision would 
not directly infringe plaintiffs’ rights through its adoption of the DVR.19  Notably, 
the Second Circuit opinion contained several key legal conclusions that will greatly 
decrease the likelihood of liability for cyber lockers.  First, in assessing the viability 
of a copyright infringement claim based on the right of public performance, the 
 
services on a solid legal foundation.”). 
 14. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was enacted in 1998 to implement the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 
676 F.3d 19, 26 (2nd Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It was “designed 
to clarify the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their 
networks.”  Id. at 27 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Notably, the DMCA created 
four “safe harbors” that allow “qualifying service providers to limit their liability for claims of copyright 
infringement based on (a) ‘transitory digital network communications,’ (b) ‘system caching,’ (c) 
‘information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users,’ and (d) ‘information location 
tools.’”  Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012). 
 15. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131–33 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 16. See, e.g., Christian Cachin & Matthias Schunter, A Cloud You Can Trust, 48 IEEE SPECTRUM 
28, 30 (Dec. 2011), available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/a-cloud-you-can-trust 
(stating that surveys show privacy is businesses’ top concern with cloud computing). 
 17. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 18. Id. at 124. 
 19. Id. at 123. 
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Second Circuit drew a distinction between a master copy and unique copies.20  
Because Cablevision’s DVR system transmitted a unique copy of the recorded 
program to the user who requested it, it was not “transmitted to the public” and thus 
not an infringement of the public performance right.21  Second, the court concluded 
that when the DVR system automatically copied a program on the request of a 
viewer to make a playback copy, such copying did not constitute volitional conduct 
on the part of the service provider, so Cablevision could not be directly liable.22 
This Note explores the implications of Cartoon Network for copyright liability 
of digital storage lockers.  Part I.A presents an overview of the Cartoon Network 
case, including a discussion of the two aforementioned aspects of the opinion:  the 
public performance reasoning and the volitional conduct analysis.  Part I.B 
provides an overview of cyber locker services; in particular, it examines the 
structural differences between cyber lockers that are used predominantly for 
legitimate purposes and those that facilitate piracy.  Part II features a close analysis 
of the Cartoon Network reasoning, and subsequently discusses recent copyright 
infringement cases against cyber locker sites MP3tunes, Megaupload and Hotfile, 
in which courts have applied the Cartoon Network reasoning.23  In light of this 
recent case law, Part III assesses the implications of Cartoon Network for the 
liability of cyber lockers:  Part III.A looks at the public performance reasoning; 
Part III.B, the volitional requirement; and Part III.C, the interaction between the 
DMCA and Cartoon Network, as seen in Capitol Records v. MP3tunes.24  Finally, 
the conclusion offers additional thoughts and suggestions as to how to balance 
better the rights of copyright owners and the interests of digital storage locker 
providers after Cartoon Network. 
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO CARTOON NETWORK AND A TAXONOMY 
OF CYBER LOCKERS 
A.  CARTOON NETWORK 
Cartoon Network involved a legal challenge to Cablevision’s remote storage 
digital video recorder (RS-DVR) system, which enabled Cablevision subscribers to 
record television shows and play them back later at their convenience.25  DVRs had 
already been in existence, and those that functioned similarly to typical VCRs were 
 
 20. Id. at 135. 
 21. Id. at 139 (“Because each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single subscriber 
using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that such transmissions are not 
performances ‘to the public,’ and therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public performance.”). 
 22. Id. at 131. 
 23. Capitol Records Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, at *6 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 
2011); Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309–10 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 24. Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 649–50.   
 25. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
(4) BODNER_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2013  7:59 PM 
2013] MASTER COPIES, UNIQUE COPIES, VOLITIONAL CONDUCT 495 
 
presumed to be protected under the Sony doctrine.26  But Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
was slightly different:  rather than saving recorded programs on the user’s 
individual set-top cable or DVR storage box, the RS-DVR stored programs 
remotely on central hard drives maintained by Cablevision.27  Accordingly, the 
technology at issue with Cablevision was closer to today’s cloud computing—in 
that it was stored on a central server—than to the VCR technology protected in 
Sony.  Cartoon Network, Universal and other producers of copyrighted movies and 
TV shows sued, alleging that through the use of its RS-DVR, Cablevision made 
unauthorized reproductions and public performances of their works.28  The Second 
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, holding that Cablevision was not directly liable for infringement by 
offering the RS-DVR to consumers.29 
Two aspects of the Second Circuit’s reasoning are particularly noteworthy:  (1) 
the distinction drawn between master copies and unique copies in analyzing the 
claim about the public performance right; and (2) and the treatment of automatic 
reproduction by a system as nonvolitional conduct. 
1.  Unique Copies Do Not Infringe the Public Performance Right 
One of the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders in the Copyright Act is 
the right to perform the work publicly.30  Section 101 contains two definitions for 
“public performance.”31  Under section 101(1), known as the public place clause, a 
performance is considered public if it occurs either “at a place open to the public” 
or at “any place where a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”32  Under section 101(2), the 
transmit clause, a performance is public if it is transmitted to a public place (as 
defined in the previous subsection) or if it is transmitted to the public by means of 
any device or process.33 
The plaintiffs in Cartoon Network argued that the playback of the recorded 
 
 26. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law—Part II, Caselaw:  
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb? 16 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., 
Paper No. 08-192, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305270.  In 
Sony, the Supreme Court held that the videotaping of free broadcast television by individual users for 
their later use (“time-shifting”) was noninfringing.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1988); see also 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 8B.01[B] (describing the 
landmark Sony decision). 
 27. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123–24. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 123.  The secondary liability issues were not litigated.  See, e.g., Vivian I. Kim, The 
Public Performance Right in the Digital Age:  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 263, 263–64 (2009). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).  The public performance right is limited to literary, musical, 
dramatic, choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other audiovisual works.  Id. 
 31. See Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 25 (“Public performances or displays can occur in public 
places, or by transmission.”). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).   
 33. Id. § 101(2). 
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programs constituted an unauthorized public performance.34  Because the 
Cablevision subscribers were watching the recorded programs on the RS-DVR in 
the privacy of their homes, the public performance claim hinged on whether this 
kind of viewing constituted a public performance under the transmit clause.35  
Cablevision argued that the customer, not Cablevision, did the transmitting and that 
the transmission was not “to the public.”36  The court agreed.37  According to the 
court, Cablevision’s remote DVR system transmitted a unique copy of the recorded 
program to the subscriber who requested it, and that unique copy could only be 
decoded “exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box.”38  Because “only one 
subscriber is capable of receiving any given RS-DVR transmission,” the Second 
Circuit concluded, the RS-DVR transmissions are not “to the public” within the 
meaning of the transmit clause.39 
But how did the transmission of a unique copy become legally salient?  The 
Second Circuit drew this conclusion from Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne.40  In 
that case, the Third Circuit held that a video rental service transmitted video 
performances to the public (and thus infringed the public performance right) when 
it played a master copy of a video for viewers in on-site private viewing rooms.41  
The court wrote:  “In concluding that [the defendant] violated the transmit clause, 
[the Third Circuit] explicitly relied on the fact that defendants showed the same 
copy of a work seriatim to its clientele.”42  Although unable to find an adequate 
explanation in Redd Horne, the Second Circuit contrived a reason for the 
master/unique distinction:  “the use of a unique copy may limit the potential 
audience of a transmission and is therefore relevant to whether that transmission is 
made ‘to the public.’”43 
2.  Reproduction by an Automated System Is Nonvolitional 
Since Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services, Inc.,44 numerous courts have held that volitional conduct is a key 
component in sustaining a claim of direct copyright infringement.45  In Netcom, the 
 
 34. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134. 
 35. Id. (“The parties agree that this case does not implicate clause (1).”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 135. 
 39. Id. at 134  The court emphasized that the transmit clause speaks of “people capable of 
receiving a particular ‘transmission’ or ‘performance,’” and not of the potential audience of a particular 
work.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 41. Id. (“Although Maxwell’s has only one copy of each film, it shows each copy repeatedly to 
different members of the public.  This constitutes a public performance.”). 
 42. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 45. See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (“[V]olitional conduct is an important element of 
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rights holders of the written works of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of 
Scientology, brought a copyright suit against an Internet service provider that 
hosted third-party bulletin boards when a user posted portions of the works on a 
board without permission.46  The court rejected the direct liability claims against 
the service providers on the grounds that something more was necessary to hold the 
service provider liable for the infringement of a user:  “Although copyright is a 
strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation 
which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a 
third party.”47  Without a requirement of volition, the acts of one person could 
create “many separate acts of infringement” and lead to “unreasonable liability.”48  
Netcom was substantially codified by the DMCA.49  Although Netcom was a 
reproduction case in the Northern District of California, the volitional conduct 
requirement has been embraced by courts in other circuits50 and extended to direct 
infringement claims of all exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.51 
In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit adopted the volitional element in its 
analysis of a copyright infringement claim based on unauthorized reproduction 
regarding playback copies created by copying program data to storage hard disks.52  
There was no question that the playback copies were fixed copies.  Instead, the 
question of liability turned on discerning who created the playback copies:  
 
direct liability”); 3 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9.5.50 (2012) (discussing the volitional 
conduct requirement). 
 46. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1365–66.  The user, a former minister in the church, was also named 
as a defendant.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 1369. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the US 
Copyright Act, COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 183, 188 (Irini A. Stamatoudi ed., 2010).  
But see infra Part III.C (discussing whether courts should apply Netcom to storing and linking service 
providers after the enactment of the DMCA). 
 50. See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).  But not all 
circuit courts have adopted this element.  See Andrey Spektor, How “Choruss” Can Turn into a 
Cacophony:  The Record Industry’s Stranglehold on the Future of Music Business, 16 RICH. J.L & TECH 
3 (2009) (regarding the Ninth Circuit’s lack of instruction regarding the volitional element).  
 51. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, at 
*4 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“The line of cases on which the Cablevision court relied-beginning with [Netcom] suggest that the 
volitional-conduct requirement should apply equally to all exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.”); 4 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.08[C] (“Although Cartoon Network addressed only the 
reproduction and public performance rights, subsequent cases have extended its requirement of 
volitional conduct across the board.”). 
 52. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008).  The 
plaintiffs also argued that their reproduction right was infringed when the program data went through a 
buffer.  Id. at 125.  Through a questionable interpretation of the Copyright Act’s definition of fixed, the 
court held that the works were not “fixed” because they were not embodied in the buffer for a period of 
more than transitory duration.  Id. at 130.  Given that they were not fixed, they did not constitute copies, 
and plaintiff’s reproduction rights were not infringed when the copyrighted program data went through 
the buffer.  Id.  For a discussion of the flaws in the court’s understanding of the fixation requirement, see 
Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 9. 
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Cablevision or the RS-DVR user.53  The distinction was important because of the 
litigants’ agreement to drop their strongest arguments:  the plaintiffs would not 
pursue a claim of secondary liability, and Cablevision would not raise a fair use 
defense.54  Consequently, a conclusion that the copies were in fact “made” by the 
end user would be the end of plaintiffs’ case—at least relating to the reproduction 
right.55  To answer the question of authorship, the Second Circuit first invoked the 
volitional requirement from Netcom.56 
In the court’s view, there were two instances of volitional conduct in the present 
case, but only one was responsible for the copying:  it was either Cablevision’s 
“conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to 
produce a copy,” or the RS-DVR user’s “conduct in ordering that system to 
produce a copy of a specific program.”57  The Second Circuit compared a copy 
machine operated by a store employee with a copy machine located on the 
proprietor’s premises but operated by the customer.  Although both copy machines 
can be used to create an infringing copy, in the former example, the human 
employee “volitionally operates” the machine to make that copy upon a customer’s 
request, whereas in the latter, the machine “automatically obeys” the customer’s 
command and “engages in no volitional conduct.”58  Because the reproduction 
occurred through a completely automated system, Cablevision’s RS-DVR was 
more like the latter.59  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded, it was the RS-DVR 
user, rather than Cablevision, who “made” the copy.60 
B.  TAXONOMY OF CYBER LOCKERS 
Like many other Internet services, cyber locker and related cloud-based service 
providers offer file hosting and file sharing services over the Internet.  Through a 
typical cyber locker service, users upload files from their own computer to their 
“lockers,” which essentially consist of personal storage space on the service 
 
 53. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
 54. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 29, at 264.  The question of authorship is of increasing importance 
even in the absence of such stipulations.  See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
§ 15.6 (2012) (“In an environment involving increasingly ‘intelligent’ systems, the question of ‘online 
who engages directly in the copying, display or performance of a work’ frequently involves having to 
draw close distinctions, grounded in technology choices, between the actions of two or more persons.”).  
 55. See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (“The question is who made this copy.  If it is 
Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory 
fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly 
disavowed by plaintiffs.”) 
 56. Id. at 131 (“When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of 
reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy 
to be made.”) 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 131–32.  The court’s choice of words—a machine that “obeys” a customer’s 
“command” versus an employee operating a machine at a customer’s “request”—nicely emphasizes the 
volitional difference between the examples. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 133; see also Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 14. 
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provider’s centralized server.  Users can subsequently reaccess their files from any 
other computer or device with an Internet connection, either by streaming or 
downloading the file. 
Many cyber locker services offer both free and subscription accounts, the former 
having limits on storage size and download time, and the latter offering increased 
or unlimited storage and faster downloads.61  With most services, users upload 
content to their locker via an Internet browser, although some service providers 
employ desktop software to make file storing even easier.62  If what the dominant 
computer companies are doing is any indication, cloud-based storage will play a 
major role in the next generation of computing:  Microsoft and Apple both updated 
their latest operating systems to seamlessly integrate with their respective cloud-
based file storage services, SkyDrive and iCloud.63 
Certain cyber locker providers have largely avoided acquiring reputations for 
facilitating piracy.  DropBox, for example, is widely used among academics and 
businesspeople and is often grouped alongside digital storage services from 
reputable companies, such as Amazon and Apple.64  One reason might be 
attributable to marketing:  services like DropBox and Amazon Cloud are pitched 
primarily as a backup service, similar to an external hard drive.65  Although file 
sharing is also a large part of cloud-based services like DropBox and Google Docs, 
the purpose of file sharing through these services tends to be for productive or 
business use, rather than for entertainment.66  For example, a major benefit of 
 
 61. See, e.g., Premium Accounts, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/premium.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013); Pricing, DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/pricing (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  In light of the 
growing number of cyber lockers, one tech blog made a chart comparing the amount of storage, file size 
limit, account price (if any) and upload methods of various digital storage lockers.  See Kevin Purdy, 
Free Online Storage Feature-by-Feature Comparison Chart, LIFEHACKER (Oct. 17, 2008, 10:00 AM), 
http://lifehacker.com/5064688/free-online-storage-feature+by+feature-comparison-chart. 
 62. See, e.g., Victoria Barrett, Dropbox:  Files Without Borders, FORBES (June 10, 2010, 12:40 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0628/technology-file-sharing-dropbox-google-files-without-
borders.html (describing Dropbox’s desktop software). 
 63. See Peter Bright, Bigger Files, Remote Access, Open Document, and More Coming to 
SkyDrive, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 20, 2012, 1:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/microsoft/news 
/2012/02/bigger-files-remote-access-opendocument-and-more-coming-to-skydrive.ars (discussing 
updates to Microsoft’s Skydrive to integrate it with Windows 8); see also Sarah Perez, Apple’s iCloud Is 
No Dropbox Killer (It’s Much More), TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 16, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/16/ 
apples-icloud-is-no-dropbox-killer-its-much-more/ (describing Apple’s deep integration of iCloud in its 
newest operating system as “building a new computer paradigm.”). 
 64. Dropbox has not, however, completely avoided legal controversy:  an FTC complaint alleged 
Dropbox failed to adequately inform users that it had the capacity to access and view all uploaded files.  
See George Wong, Dropbox Isn’t as Safe as You Thought, UBERGIZMO (May 13, 2011, 4:37 PM), 
http://www.ubergizmo.com/2011/05/dropbox/. 
 65. See, e.g., Janko Roettgers, Will the MPAA Target RapidShare, Megaupload or Dropbox?, 
GIGAOM (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:33 PM), http://gigaom.com/video/mpaa-lawsuit-hotfile-rapidshare-
megaupload-dropbox/ (referring to Dropbox as a backup service). 
 66. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Before Shutdown, Megaupload Ate up More Corporate Bandwith than 
the Dropbox, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/01/ 
before-shutdown-megaupload-ate-up-more-corporate-bandwidth-than-dropbox.ars (noting a distinction 
between “tools that help me get my job done and tools that help us stay entertained”).  In addition to 
storing and sharing files with others, Google Docs offers a web-based Word processor that enables users 
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DropBox and Google Docs is that both services synchronize different versions and 
drafts of a particular document such that multiple users can simultaneously work on 
that document, from different locations, with all edits instantaneously reflected in 
the master file.67 
But the business/entertainment distinction is not the defining line:  some cyber 
locker sites and software that are strictly for storing music files have nevertheless 
avoided an illicit reputation, like iTunes Match, Amazon Cloud Player and Google 
Music Beta.68  The legitimacy of these locker services is certainly linked to their 
affiliation with such reputable tech companies.  It might also help that all three 
services go hand-in-hand with the companies’ online stores that sell digital music 
legitimately (iTunes, Amazon.com and Google Music, respectively).69  Because 
many users might have an extensive digital musical collection, some of these cyber 
locker services facilitate uploading content into the cloud by automatically 
uploading any song files purchased through the service provider’s MP3 store, such 
as iTunes or Amazon.70 
On the opposite end of the spectrum is a type of cyber locker sites, often called 
“direct download links” or “one-click file hosts,” which are widely known as 
breeding grounds for copyright infringement.  These cyber lockers, which include 
Rapidshare, Hotfile, Megaupload, MediaFire and 4Shared, among others, share 
certain structural and business elements that facilitate the use of their services for 
unlawful file sharing.  Through these locker services, users upload a file on a Web 
browser, and the service automatically generates a URL (or “hotlink”) specific to 
that file’s location on the server.71  The user can subsequently retrieve the file again 
by going to that URL from any Internet browser and downloading the file.  Because 
of the nature of file retrieval, the direct download link cyber lockers typically lack 
any restriction on who can subsequently download a file—anyone who has the 
 
to create documents through their web browsers, without having to open up the application.  See, e.g., 
Anne Eisenberg, Digital Storage Options for Workers on the Go, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at BU4. 
 67. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 66, at BU4.  iCloud also has a useful synchronization 
function:  synching information stored on different applications.  See Perez, supra note 63 (“But Apple’s 
iCloud is not just about building a better Dropbox—it’s about keeping everything in sync:  Mail, 
Contacts, Calendars, Reminders, Bookmarks, Notes, Photos, Accounts, and more.”). 
 68. Both Google and Amazon also have general cloud-based lockers for storing all types of files 
(Google Docs and Amazon Cloud, respectively), in addition to more specific services or applications for 
storing and syncing music files (for example, Google Music and Amazon Cloud Player).  See Claire 
Cain Miller, Amazon Introduces a Digital Music Locker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011, 12:42 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/amazon-introduces-a-digital-music-
locker/?scp=7&sq=digital%20storage%20locker&st=cse. 
 69. While Apple and Amazon’s music lockers were created after the companies began selling 
digital music files, Google’s locker service predated its music store.  See Ben Sisario, Google Opens a 
Digital Music Store, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2011/11/16/google-opens-a-digital-music-store/?scp=1&sq=% 22google%20music%22&st=cse.  
 70. See Miller, supra note 68. 
 71. See, e.g., Roettgers, supra note 65 (stating that direct download link sites like Hotfile allow 
users to directly link or “hotlink” files hosted on the server); see also Annemarie Bridy, Is Online 
Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 704 (2011) (describing 
RapidShare and MegaUpload as direct download links). 
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URL can download it.72  The user can send the URL to third parties, even those 
without cyber locker accounts of their own, or the user could post the URL on a 
bulletin board so that third parties can download the same content.73  Although 
services like Dropbox and iCloud also enable file sharing, such file sharing services 
are substantially more private and subject to greater restrictions than the file sharing 
services offered by the direct download links.74  Moreover, whereas one-click file 
hosts could feasibly make the links expire after a certain time period or number of 
subsequent downloads, many choose not to do so.75 
Although virtually all of these cyber locker companies prohibit uploading 
copyrighted content in their terms of use,76 it is unsurprising that the direct 
download link locker services are frequently—and perhaps predominantly—used to 
store and share pirated works.77  Many of these cyber locker providers actually 
 
 72. Disney and the other plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Hotfile “engineers its URL links 
so that anyone can download the linked-to content,” despite its ability to “substantially mitigate the 
massive public distribution of copyrighted content by password-protecting the ability to download files, 
thereby ensuring that only the account-holder (or those individually authorized by the account-holder) 
could make copies of the files uploaded by the account-holder.”  See Complaint for Copyright 
Infringement at 13, Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 
11CV20427). 
 73. See, e.g., Seth Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of Online Music 
Distribution:  Innovation in the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1795 
n.55 (noting that direct download links can be posted on Internet message boards or blogs).  In fact, 
sharing a file easily with friends was one of the purposes the founder of RapidShare sought to fulfill.  
See About Us, RAPIDSHARE, https://rapidshare.com/#!rsag_about (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  
 74. See Matt Burns, With MegaUpload Down, Who’s Next?  RapidShare?  SoundCloud?  
DropBox?, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 20, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/20/megaupload-computer-
abuse-reinforcement-education (describing file sharing through DropBox, iCloud and Amazon S3 as 
inherently more private than file sharing through MegaUpload). 
 75. For example, Hotfile states in its Frequently Asked Questions:  “In principle, we host data 
without a time limit,” although expiration is clearly possible, as “files that have not been accessed for 90 
days are deleted to relieve the system of forgotten and not needed content.”  See FAQ, HOTFILE, 
http://www.hotfile.com/faq.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  Note, however, that this rule does not apply 
to premium account members, whose hotlinks are apparently never deleted for systematic cleaning.  Id.  
Similarly, Hotfile does not limit the number of daily downloads, although free account holders are 
subject to a thirty minute wait between downloads.  Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Terms of Service, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/terms-of-service.html (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (“You promise that you have all intellectual property rights (including without limitation 
copyright and trademark rights), licenses, and permissions that may be needed to upload, store, or share 
your User Content.  By uploading, storing, or sharing any User Content, you promise that doing so does 
not infringe any intellectual property rights of another person.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, 
at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (“This much is clear:  Megaupload allegedly stores billions of dollars of 
‘pirated’ full-length movies, songs, software, and images on its servers.”); see also Eriq Gardner, Read 
the MPAA’s Big Lawsuit Against ‘Cyberlocking’ Site Hotfile, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thr-esq/read-mpaas-big-lawsuit-cyberlocking-97400 
(describing Paramount Pictures COO Fred Huntsberry’s declaration that cyber lockers are Hollywood’s 
biggest threat).  Traditionally, copyright piracy referred to the unauthorized copying or manufacturing of 
protected material, to be distributed and sold, for commercial gain.  See Darrell Panethiere, The 
Persistence of Piracy:  The Consequences for Creativity, for Culture, and for Sustainable Development, 
E-COPYRIGHT BULL., July-Sept. 2005, at 2, available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/ 
28696/11513329261panethiere_en.pdf/panethiere_en.pdf.  However, a modern version of copyright 
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offer monetary incentives to users who substantially increase web traffic, such as 
paying cash to a user when a file uploaded by that user is downloaded more than 
one thousand times.78  Additionally, users who pay for premium accounts can 
typically avoid any restrictions on download speed or wait time.79  With business 
tactics like this, it is no wonder several of the direct download link type of cyber 
locker sites have made their way onto lists of the world’s most trafficked 
websites.80  Accordingly, there is a strong argument that such cyber lockers induce, 
contribute to and profit from the infringement that takes place through their 
services.81 
From the legitimate to the questionable, all cyber lockers have two key features 
in common:  one that reduces the use of the service for piracy, and another that 
somewhat competes with the first.  First, most cyber lockers lack one structural 
element common to many file sharing systems which were notorious for facilitating 
infringement:  a search function through which a user can search through the 
respective pool of shared files to find and download files.82  As many cyber locker 
providers market their lockers for personal use only, permitting third parties to 
access content stored in another’s locker without that user’s permission would 
undermine the (alleged) purpose.83  However, there have been allegations that some 
 
piracy generally includes any infringement of another’s exclusive rights to a copyrighted work, even 
without an economic gain.  See id.  Thus, the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works over the 
Internet, even without any economic gain, would generally be considered piracy.  E.g., id.; see also  
What is Online Piracy?, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=What-is-
Online-Piracy (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
 78. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1306–07 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 
2011) (describing Hotfile’s incentives plan); see also Megaupload, 2011 WL 3203117, at *2 (describing 
Megaupload’s Rewards programs); Roettgers, supra note 65 (stating rewards systems like Hotfile’s are a 
business model common to one-click file hosts).  
 79. See, e.g., Ernesto, supra note 3. 
 80. See Bill Wyman, So Long, and Thanks for All the Piracy, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2012, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/technology/2012/01/megaupload_shutdown_what_the_site_s_de
parture_means_for_other_traffic_hogging_cyberlockers_.html.  For example, the cyber locker site 
MediaFire currently appears at number sixty-five on a list of the most-visited sites, based on web traffic 
over the past three months.  See MediaFire.com Site Info, ALEXA, at http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/ 
mediafire.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  Approximately fifty-three percent of visits to MediaFire.com 
consist of only one page view.  Id. 
 81. The district court in Megaupload specifically noted that, in its motion to dismiss, the cyber 
locker company did not even dispute the allegation that it induces, causes or materially contributes to 
infringing conduct.  Megaupload, 2011 WL 3203117, at *6. 
 82. Napster’s search engine, located on a centralized server, played a large part in the finding of 
liability.  See generally Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (describing the Napster, Grokster and Aimster 
copyright suits and the structural differences between the respective services).  See also Roettgers, supra 
note 65 (comparing Hotfile to file sharing services like Napster which “got in trouble because they 
offered a central, searchable index of files to download”). 
 83. See, e.g., FAQ, supra note 75 (“Q:  Can I search the Hotfile server for certain files?  A:  No.  
Hotfile protects the privacy of our users.  Only the person storing a file on Hotfile gets the download 
link.  That person decides who should have access to the link.  A file can only be downloaded if the 
download link details are known.”).  Of course, in the case of direct download links, a recipient can pass 
the URL for the shared file to countless third parties, who would technically be able to access the work 
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of the direct download link sites make payments to third party sites that catalog 
URLs of popular, infringing work stored on the cyber lockers servers.84 
Second, most of the cyber locker services do not restrict the type or original 
source of file that can be uploaded, other than by limits on file size.  For example, 
instead of storing all MP3s regardless of original source, Apple could feasibly 
restrict the use of its locker service to storing only MP3s purchased through its 
iTunes store.85  In fact, Apple limits MP3 storage in this respect on one of its cloud 
services, iCloud.86  But through its counterpart locker service, iTunes Match, 
subscribing customers can store music obtained from other sources, even music the 
customer imported from CDs.87  Similarly, Amazon also permits all music files to 
be uploaded, and it only gives incentives to store music purchased from its stores.88  
One might guess that these companies feel that restricting their entire digital locker 
service to storage of files purchased through their online store would broadly limit 
the utility and attractiveness of such storage services.  Both iTunes Match and 
Google Music limit the manner in which users can reaccess stored content, 
however:  iTunes Match enables only streaming transmissions of stored content, 
rather than download transmissions; in contrast, Google Music apparently permits 
download transmissions, as well as streaming transmissions, as long as the 
download transmission contains music purchased through its music store.89 
Because of this second characteristic, virtually all cyber locker providers face a 
common problem:  an inability to ascertain whether an upload file was purchased 
legally elsewhere or downloaded illegally.90  In fact, cyber locker precursor 
MP3.com arguably made more of an attempt to verify ownership (however easily 
evaded) at the upload stage than most modern cyber lockers.91  Those who portray 
their service as primarily an external hard drive may not see any legal problem.  For 
example, Amazon’s director of music declared:  “We don’t need a license to store 
music.”92  In spite of such assurances, a multitude of copyright questions exists 
 
without needing express approval from the initial uploader.   
 84. This was alleged in the complaint against Megaupload.  See Megaupload, 2011 WL 3203117, 
at *2. 
 85. See Miller, supra note 68. 
 86. See iCloud, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/features/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (stating 
that iCloud will store new and past music purchased on iTunes). 
 87. See iTunes Match, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/itunes-match/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013). 
 88. For example, Amazon’s Cloud Player automatically uploads songs users bought on Amazon, 
but users have to manually upload songs purchased from other music stores.  See Miller, supra note 68.  
 89. See id.; see also Jacqui Cheng, Google Opens Music Download Store, Welcomes Artists to 
Upload Directly, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2011/ 
11/google-opens-music-download-store-welcomes-artists-to-upload-directly.ars.  For an explanation of 
the difference between download and stream transmissions, see infra Part III.A. 
 90. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 68 (describing an issue common to all cyber lockers). 
 91. In order to access a specific digital song, an MP3.com user had to “prove” he owned a copy 
of it on a CD digital file either by inserting the copy of his CD into his CD-ROM drive, or purchasing 
the CD from one of the site’s cooperating online retailers.  See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 
92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 92. See Miller, supra note 68. 
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when cyber locker services are used to store copyrighted content, even that which is 
purchased legally:  Is what is stored in the locker technically a copy of a work, and, 
if so, does it violate the reproduction right?  When a user streams a file stored in his 
or her locker, does that constitute a public performance within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act?  If a user shares a copyrighted work stored in his or her locker with 
others, without authorization from the right holder, could the cyber locker provider 
be held directly or secondarily liable? 
Despite the proliferation of cyber locker services, there is very little case law on 
them, in part because of their relative novelty.93  Judicial opinions, however, in 
three recent cyber locker cases involving MP3tunes, Megaupload and Hotfile, 
discussed in Part II, shed some perspective on these questions. 
II.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CARTOON NETWORK REASONING AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN THE MP3TUNES, MEGAUPLOAD AND HOTFILE 
DECISIONS 
At first glance, it might seem unlikely that the reasoning in a case about a cable 
television provider’s DVR system would have any impact whatsoever on cyber 
lockers because of basic structural differences in the technologies.  For example, a 
DVR user is more limited in the variety of content (i.e., scheduled television 
programming) he can record through DVR, whereas a cyber locker user could 
conceivably upload a variety of types of content (music, television shows, movies, 
documents, spreadsheets and so on) obtained from numerous sources.  
Additionally, the nature of the DVR system places inherent limitations on the 
performance of stored content (and arguably precludes unauthorized distribution):  
although the user can watch the recorded content upon his demand, it will play only 
on that very DVR machine or on select TVs with receivers or set tops in that 
home.94  But direct download cyber lockers facilitate subsequent distribution:  the 
 
 93. Litigation strategy is another reason for the lack of case law:  several cyber lockers have 
gained a bit of a reputation for quickly settling, and organizational plaintiffs like the MPAA have taken 
their time to bring select, strategic suits.  See enigmax, Hotfile Battles MPAA over Private User Data 
Disclosure, TORRENTFREAK (June 25, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/hotfile-battles-mpaa-over-private-
user-data-disclosure-110625 (suggesting the MPAA chose to go after Hotfile in particular because of 
Hotfile’s track record for settling quickly and relative lack of might compared to Megaupload and 
Rapidshare). 
 94. Some television service providers now offer “multi-room” services in which a user can watch 
recorded content on multiple TVs in her house, which is advertised to allow for a more “seamless” user 
experience.  See SAMSUNG Announces Set-Top “Boxless” Viewing in All 2012 Smart TVs, SAMSUNG 
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.samsung.com/us/news/20087; see also About Verizon FiOS TV Multi-Room 
DVR, VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/support/residential/tv/fiostv/receivers/multi-room+dvr/ 
multi-room+dvr.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); Direct TV Whole-Home DVR, DIRECTV, 
http://www.directv.com/technology/wholehome (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).  Yet even with this service, 
the television subscriber’s use and enjoyment of stored content is still tethered to her home:  typically, 
only televisions with a corresponding receiver or set-top box will be able to access the content stored on 
the primary DVR player.  See, e.g., About Verizon FiOS TV Multi-Room DVR, supra (explaining that 
each TV set must be connected to a set-top box in order to play stored content); What Is the Maximum 
Number of TVs that Can Share One HD DVR?, DIRECTV, http://support.directv.com/app/answers/ 
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download URL is all that is needed to send an exact copy of the content to others.95 
Despite such differences, DVRs and cyber lockers share a common feature:  
each employs automated technology to enable users to store and subsequently 
reaccess or play content, and grants users increased control over when (for both 
DVRs and cyber lockers) or where (for cyber lockers) such subsequent access will 
take place.  In this respect, and as will be discussed below in Part II.A, Cartoon 
Network’s formulation of how transmissions, performances and reproductions that 
take place on an automated system fit into and coexist with our copyright scheme 
carries particular relevance for both cyber locker providers and rights holders.  
Parts II.B and II.C examine three recent cyber locker cases in which the Cartoon 
Network reasoning was applied. 
A.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CARTOON NETWORK REASONING 
1.  Public Performance Right 
Although a bright line rule distinguishing master copies from unique copies has 
its efficiencies, such a rule is based on an interpretation of the transmit clause 
which is inconsistent with the statutory text.96  First, the transmission clause 
specifies “capable of receiving a performance,” yet the Second Circuit seemed to 
interpret it as capable of receiving a particular transmission.  As Professor 
Ginsburg states: 
The court’s declaration “that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to 
the public, it refers to the performance created by the act of transmission,” 
demonstrates that the court confused “performance” and “transmission.”  The statute 
does not refer to the performance created by the act of transmission.  The 
transmission does not itself “perform” (as in “play” or “render”) the work; it 
communicates a work so that its performance will be perceived as the member of the 
public receives the communication.97 
Second, even if the court’s interpretation were correct—that the performance is 
created by a transmission—then only simultaneous transmission can be to the 
 
detail/a_id/2734 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (“With DIRECTV’s Whole-Home DVR service, up to 15 
TVs can share one DVR.  One of them must be connected to the HD DVR receiver and the others must 
be connected to HD receivers”).  In this respect, television service providers maintain substantial control 
over the performance of the stored content.  
 95. See supra Section I.B (discussing the structure of direct download links). 
 96. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 26 (“The court’s parsing of the text of the Copyright Act 
is peculiar if not perverse.”). 
 97. Id.  The Second Circuit nevertheless persisted with this interpretation in a subsequent opinion:  
“As we concluded in Cartoon Network, ‘when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the 
public, it refers to the performance created by the act of transmission,’ not simply to transmitting a 
recording of a performance.  ASCAP’s alternative interpretation is flawed because, in disaggregating the 
‘transmission’ from the simultaneous ‘performance’ and treating the transmission itself as a 
performance, ASCAP renders superfluous the subsequent ‘a performance . . . of the work’ as the object 
of the transmittal.”).  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 73 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011). 
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“public.”98  But the transmit clause expressly contemplates the possibility of serial 
receipt of the transmission by encompassing a performance regardless of “whether 
the members of the public . . . receive it . . . at the same time or different times.”99  
Accordingly, the court’s interpretation would obviate part of the statutory definition 
of public performance by transmission.100 
In addition to conflicting with the statutory text, the court’s reading of the 
transmit clause broadly limits the public performance right in two ways.  First, 
whenever a transmission is tailored to a particular person, such that only that 
person is capable of receiving that transmission, it is not “to the public.”101  It is 
easy to see how many transmissions could be reframed as “unique” and thus 
nonpublic under this reasoning.  For example, when a customer purchases a movie 
on demand via Cablevision, the transmission is (presumably) customized to reach 
that paying customer’s cable box.102 
In addition, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the transmit clause also creates 
a legal distinction between downloading and streaming.  When the focus is 
(incorrectly) on the performance created by the act of transmission, one might note 
a difference between streaming transmissions, in which the audiovisual work plays 
while it is transmitted, and download transmissions, in which the work can only be 
played after transmission.  Under this logic, it must follow that content delivered 
through a streaming transmission constitutes a public performance, whereas content 
delivered by a download transmission does not.103  The Second Circuit reached 
these conclusions in United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, where it reiterated its flawed reading from Cartoon Network.104 
 
 98. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 26 (“[I]t is not possible to transmit a performance ‘created by the 
act of transmission’ to members of the public ‘at different times.’”). 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 25. 
 100. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 26 (“The court’s interpretation thus reads non simultaneous 
receipt out of the statute.”).  
 101. Id.; see also Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 532 (2010) (“Switching the words ‘performance’ and 
‘transmission’ changed the outcome of the case because there will be viewers who will be capable of 
receiving a performance of a network telecast (subscribers to Cablevision’s feed of HBO) but not 
capable of receiving particular transmissions of that performance (nonsubscribers to Cablevision’s RS-
DVR service).  This is because nonsubscribers won’t have access to any RS-DVR copies, and even RS-
DVR subscribers will have access only to their own copies.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 26 (suggesting on-demand services might be nonpublic 
under the Second Circuit’s reading of the transmit clause).  This is an interesting twist, as Cablevision 
emphasized the unique copy distinction in order to distinguish itself from video on demand.  See 
Malkan, supra note 101, at 522 (“The challenge that Cablevision faced was to distinguish RS-DVR from 
VOD.  It would have to convince the court that RS-DVR would not give rise to public performances 
because each RS-DVR transmission would emanate from a distinct copy.”). 
 103. The proposed and ultimately unenacted legislation to stop online piracy included higher 
criminal penalties for illegal streaming, because as it currently stands, the maximum possible penalty for 
criminal streaming is a misdemeanor, which discourages prosecutors from pursuing cases of willful, 
criminal streaming.  See Stop Online Piracy Act:  Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).  
 104. See 627 F.3d 64, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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2.  Volitional Conduct 
Like the public performance reasoning, the Second Circuit’s volitional conduct 
analysis has raised numerous questions.105  In particular, was it proper to extend 
Netcom, which concerned an Internet service provider, to cable television?  Netcom 
was motivated by the concern that, absent a volitional element, the entire Internet 
could be held liable for the conduct of a single user.106  Although the Cablevision 
district court thought Netcom should be limited to its Internet context, the Second 
Circuit expressly disagreed, finding the volitional element a “particularly rational 
interpretation of § 106, rather than a special-purpose rule applicable only to 
ISPs.”107  Yet even if the substantive context were similar enough, the Netcom 
decision was handed down in 1995; significant changes in technology and 
copyright law have since taken place.108 
The Second Circuit’s decision to impose a volitional element at all was also 
somewhat surprising.109  Is volitional conduct merely a subcomponent of an 
infringement claim that has always existed (just not explicitly), or did Cartoon 
Network essentially create an affirmative defense for service providers?110  One 
hypothesis suggests that lurking behind the court’s reasoning was an implicit 
conclusion that the services of the RS-DVR were all too similar to those of the 
VCR, which the Supreme Court deemed noninfringing in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios.111 
Much confusion remains regarding the volitional element.  Although the Second 
Circuit described what is not volitional conduct when it comes to automated 
systems, what exactly is volitional conduct when it comes to an automated service?  
Moreover, should it apply to Internet service providers who may be eligible for safe 
harbor protection under the DMCA?  These questions will be further explored 
below through a comparison of cyber locker cases that reached different 
 
 105. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 15 (“[I]t is not clear that volition must always be a 
distinct element of the violation of the reproduction right.”). 
 106. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 
(N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,131 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the Netcom court’s concern). 
 107. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131.  This is the same conclusion the Fourth Circuit reached in 
CoStar.  See CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 108. For example, the legal disputes over Napster and Grokster and the enactment of the DMCA.  
Professor Nimmer describes the Netcom decision as an appropriate resolution of the “novel issues then 
pending,” but “inapposite at present” in light of amendments to the Copyright Act.  4 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.08[C].  Furthermore, there is an argument that the DMCA codified 
Netcom’s volitional requirement for some but not all of the safe harbors.  See infra Part III.C. 
 109. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.08[C] (describing the Second Circuit’s 
description of volition as an element as “revolutionary,” given that cases up to the Supreme Court level 
have defined only two elements for copyright infringement). 
 110. E.g., id. 
 111. See Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 16 (“Because the users’ were engaged in a higher-tech form 
of ‘time shifting,’ and, under Sony, time shifting (at least of free broadcast television) is non infringing, 
then the higher-tech version must be non infringing, too.  That calculus may have informed the court’s 
assessment of ‘who’ made the copy.”). 
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conclusions about volition, despite nearly identical facts. 
B.  THE MP3TUNES DECISION112 
On the spectrum from respected digital storage services to the less scrupulous 
direct download link providers, MP3tunes.com sat somewhere in the middle.  
Although the service did not offer monetary incentives for uploading content that 
generated vast web traffic, it facilitated searching for free content on the web.  
MP3tunes worked in conjunction with other software created by Robertson to 
facilitate finding and storing content in lockers.  MP3tunes’s partner program and 
website, Sideload.com, featured a search engine that enabled users to search for 
free songs on the Internet by keywords, such as an artist’s name; it also enabled 
users to play or download (“sideload”) the songs into their storage lockers.113  
MP3tunes kept track of the sources of songs in users’ lockers, including (because 
of Sideload) third-party websites from which users sideloaded songs.114  Moreover, 
Sideload’s searching capability improved as more users used it:  whenever a user 
sideloaded a song, the artist, song and third-party website would be added to 
Sideload’s search engine database.115 
The copyright dispute began when record label EMI sent takedown notices 
identifying infringing songs and the URLs of websites that had posted these songs 
without authorization.  EMI also demanded that MP3tunes remove all other content 
by the identified EMI artists.116  MP3tunes removed links on Sideload.com to the 
identified URLs, but it did not remove from users’ lockers songs which had been 
sideloaded from those websites.117  It also asked EMI to identify additional 
infringing links, but EMI declined, stating the representative list was sufficient.118  
EMI subsequently initiated a copyright suit, claiming infringement of its 
reproduction, distribution and public performance rights, as well as secondary 
liability for inducing copyright infringement.119  On the direct infringement claims, 
the court granted summary judgment in part for MP3tunes because it complied with 
its obligations under section 512 and thus qualified for safe harbor.120  
Nevertheless, it was not protected by the safe harbor for its failure to remove from 
storage lockers songs that had been sideloaded from the sites listed in the takedown 
notices.121  With respect to those songs, the court granted summary judgment on 
 
 112. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 113. Id. at 634.  Sideload offered free plug-in software that enabled users to sideload free songs on 
third-party websites directly from the third-party site via a Sideload button.  Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (“Thus, as users discover free songs on the Internet, the number of songs available through 
Sideload.com increases.”) 
 116. Id. at 635. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Complaint, MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (No. 07 CIV 9931). 
 120. See MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
 121. Id. 
(4) BODNER_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/2013  7:59 PM 
2013] MASTER COPIES, UNIQUE COPIES, VOLITIONAL CONDUCT 509 
 
the contributory liability claims for EMI.122 
Overall, the decision was widely viewed as a victory for cyber lockers, 
particularly for two reasons:  (1) the application of the Cartoon Network public 
performance reasoning protected a widely-used digital storage technique; and (2) 
that MP3tunes largely escaped liability because of a safe harbor under the 
DMCA.123 
First, through the application of the master/unique distinction, the opinion 
endorsed a common data compression method known as deduplication.124  The 
court found that MP3tunes did not use a master copy to store or play back songs 
stored in the digital locker:  its system, which incorporated a “standard data 
compression algorithm that eliminates redundant digital data,” preserved the “exact 
digital copy of each song uploaded.”125  Some critics feared the Cartoon Network 
distinction between master copies and unique copies implied that Internet service 
providers would be more vulnerable to copyright claims if they used deduplication 
to save hard drive space.126  But MP3tunes ratified the use of this technology 
because the company retained unique copies of the music files, and thus any 
performances were not to the public under the transmit clause.127 
An examination of the underlying technology suggests this conclusion about 
MP3tunes’ storage technology is somewhat dubious.  MP3tunes used a standard 
algorithm that created an identification number, or hash tag, based on the data 
sequences in a music file.128  But if “different users upload[ed] the same song 
containing identical blocks of data to MP3tunes’ servers,” those blocks were 
assigned the same hash tag and “typically saved only once.”129  When a user played 
or downloaded a song from the cyber locker, MP3tunes’ storage system used “the 
hash tags associated with the uploaded song to reconstruct the exact file the user 
originally uploaded to his locker.”130  Consequently, the district court’s conclusion 
that the service “preserved” the unique digital copy uploaded by a user depends on 
the following conclusions:  that the saving of the data comprising a particular 
increment of a song does not constitute a master copy, although each part of a song 
is saved only once; and that the “reconstruction” of the exact file uploaded, from 
 
 122. Id. at 643. 
 123. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Record Labels Get Hollow Victory in MP3tunes Infringement 
Case, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08/record-
labels-get-hollow-victory-in-mp3tunes-infringement-case/. 
 124. See, e.g., id.; see also Timothy B. Lee, Unlicensed:  Are Google Music and Amazon Cloud 
Player Illegal?, ARS TECHNICA (July 4, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/are-
google-music-and-amazon-cloud-player-illegal/ (stating that deduplication techniques are common to 
the IT industry, used by mail servers, cloud-storage systems and backup software). 
 125. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 650. 
 126. Lee, supra note 123 (stating that the Cartoon Network decision had suggested that locker sites 
would be more vulnerable to copyright infringement claims if they used deduplication technology to 
save hard drive space). 
 127. See MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 650.  
 128. Id. at 634. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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these singularly-saved chunks of data, forms a unique copy. 
The second noteworthy aspect of the MP3tunes decision is the great extent to 
which MP3tunes was protected by the safe harbor defense—and the lack of 
substantial hurdles to qualify for the defense.  As Internet service providers who 
store material at the direction of users, cyber lockers are likely to seek safe harbor 
under the DMCA.  One of the requirements for claiming the safe harbor is that 
service providers must promptly remove or disable access to unauthorized material 
identified in notices by rights holders.131  But this removal obligation does not 
extend particularly far:  take-down notices must identify more than just the 
copyrighted work that is allegedly infringed; they must also provide reasonably 
sufficient information for the service provider to locate the infringing material 
(usually by providing the URL).132  The DMCA does not impose an affirmative 
duty to monitor for infringement.133 
Accordingly, the district court held that MP3tunes’ responsibility for searching 
the contents of storage lockers on its servers was limited to that which was 
specified in the notices from EMI and which its system was capable of searching—
i.e., MP3tunes only had to search its storage lockers for content from the third-
party websites, specified in EMI’s takedown notices, and remove the same.134  
Beyond that, MP3tunes had no obligation to conduct a “burdensome investigation 
in order to determine whether songs in its users’ accounts were unauthorized 
copies.”135 
A counterfactual raises questions about willful blindness:  suppose MP3tunes 
did not own Sideload.com and thus lacked the capability of tracking the source (via 
URL) of the works uploaded into lockers.  In this respect, it would be more akin to 
the direct download link type of cyber lockers, like Hotfile.  Even if rights holders 
were somehow able to search the lockers to identify infringing content in takedown 
notices,136 the cyber locker company would still have to ascertain whether copies of 
the work were authorized or unauthorized on a locker-by-locker basis.  In that case, 
the court’s statement rejecting a “burdensome investigation” seems to imply there 
would be no takedown obligation. 
 
 131. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012). 
 132. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.B04[B][2]. 
 133. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1)–(2).  Outside of the notification context, a service provider must also 
act expeditiously to remove infringing material if it gains actual knowledge of infringing material or 
becomes aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing material is apparent (i.e., red flags).  Id. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).   
 134. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (“There is no genuine dispute that MP3tunes complies with 
the requirements of the DMCA with respect to songs sideloaded from websites not listed in the 
takedown notices.”), 
 135. Id. 
 136. The DMCA places the burden of searching for unauthorized content on the right holder, 
rather than the service provider—a seemingly backwards approach, given that the service provider is 
arguably better-situated than the right holder to scan newly posted or hosted material.  See, e.g., Lital 
Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 
1202–03 (2011) (“Thus, content owners must constantly monitor the entire repertoire of every site on 
the Internet, in every file format, in order to locate infringing materials.”). 
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The MP3tunes opinion thus seems to suggest that cyber locker purveyors might 
avoid liability (and more easily satisfy their obligations under the DMCA) by 
forgoing any indexing and assuming the user is uploading legally obtained content 
for her personal use.137  The next section examines two recent cases outside of the 
Second Circuit involving cyber lockers that lacked such indexing capabilities. 
C.  THE MEGAUPLOAD AND HOTFILE DECISIONS 
One-click file hosts Megaupload and Hotfile recently defended copyright 
infringement claims—with surprisingly different results.  Although neither suit was 
brought in the Second Circuit, the Cartoon Network decision and volitional conduct 
approach played a central role in both opinions. 
Although Megaupload’s site was recently shut down by the FBI on charges of 
criminal copyright infringement, the company also faced civil liability during the 
summer of 2011.138  In Perfect 10 v. Megaupload, Perfect 10, which was in the 
business of creating and selling “adult entertainment products” and media, alleged 
that Megaupload stored pirated works worth billions of dollars on its servers and 
that Megaupload “depends on, and provides substantial payouts to, affiliate 
websites who catalogue the URLs providing access to the mass of pirated content 
on Megaupload’s servers.”139 
Moving to dismiss, Megaupload argued that it did not engage in volitional 
conduct and cited Cartoon Network and MP3tunes.com as support.140  The court 
disagreed:  Megaupload was neither a passive conduit nor a “mere file storage 
system,” and Perfect 10 adequately alleged that Megaupload engaged in volitional 
conduct to support the claim of direct infringement.141  Although there was no 
allegation that Megupload itself (i.e., its employees) uploaded infringing content,142 
the court listed specific actions taken by Megaupload that, taken together, evinced 
volitional conduct:  (1) the defendant’s distinct websites, such as megaporn.com 
and megavideo.com, which were created “presumably in an effort to streamline 
 
 137. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, EMI Loses yet Again in Its Quixotic War with Michael Robertson 
and MP3Tunes, TECHDIRT (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111103/04442116611/ 
emi-loses-yet-again-its-quixotic-war-with-michael-robertson-mp3tunes.shtml (“[T]he judge makes it 
clear that with a music locker like MP3Tunes, there’s no legal reason why the company should 
automatically cut off someone who is a repeat infringer, since all uploads are for personal use, and not to 
the wider [I]nternet.”).  
 138. For more about the criminal investigation and indictment, see Geoffrey A. Fowler, Devlin 
Barrett & Sam Schechner, U.S. Shuts Offshore File-Share ‘Locker,’ WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2012), at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204616504577171060611948408.html?mod=WSJ_hp
_mostpop_read. 
 139. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, at *1, *2 
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011). 
 140. Id. at *4; see also Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Megaupload, 2011 WL 3203117 (May 16, 2011) (No. 11CV00191), 2011 WL 2618814.  But note that 
the opinions in Megaupload and Hotfile were written before either the initial decision (August 2011) and 
amended decision (October 2011) in the MP3tunes case, and thus relied on a prior opinion.   
 141. Megaupload, 2011 WL 3203117, at *4. 
 142. Id. at *4 n.3. 
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users’ access to different types of media”; (2) encouragement and occasional 
payment of users via the Rewards program to incentivize uploading popular media; 
(3) payouts to affiliate websites that maintain a catalog of all available files; and (4) 
awareness that its service was being used for infringement.143  A motion to dismiss 
the contributory infringement claim was also denied, whereas the vicarious liability 
claim was dismissed without prejudice.144 
A Florida district court reached the opposite conclusion about volitional conduct 
with a virtually identically file-storing service in Disney Enterprises v. Hotfile.145  
The court discussed Netcom and stated that the volitional conduct requirement has 
been approved by other courts, including the Second Circuit in Cartoon 
Network.146  Without further discussion of the facts at hand, the court concluded 
that “the law is clear” that Hotfile was not liable for direct infringement.147  
Although the defendants “allegedly encourage massive infringement,” the website 
allows users to upload and download copyrighted material “without volitional 
conduct from Hotfile.”148  Citing MP3tunes and Arista Records v. Usenet, Disney 
also argued that Hotfile was directly liable because it created a plan to induce 
infringement.149  The court, however, thought the cases were wrongly decided:  
Arista ignored the language of Netcom and subsequent cases which stated that 
knowledge and inducement only gives rise to secondary liability.150  As for 
MP3tunes, the court stated that the opinion had “no analysis” and “simply cited 
Arista and Russ Hardenburgh for support.”151  Yet, according to the Hotfile court, 
the direct liability in Russ Hardenburgh was justified because the defendant 
committed a volitional act by having its employees upload copyrighted material to 
the server.152  Furthermore, although Hotfile made additional copies of the works 
once uploaded to the server, the “automatic conduct of software, unaided by human 
intervention, is not volitional.”153 
There is notable tension between the Megaupload and Hotfile courts’ 
suggestions about what constitutes volitional conduct for a direct download link 
service provider.  Arista Records v. Usenet is of particular interest,154 as the 
 
 143. Id. at *4. 
 144. Id. at *6.  The parties settled the lawsuit in the fall of 2011.  See Greg Sandoval, Megaupload 
Settles Copyright Suit with Porn Studio, CNET (Nov. 3, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31001_3-57317577-261/megaupload-settles-copyright-suit-with-porn-studio/. 
 145. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2011). 
 146. Id. at 1308. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), is 
discussed infra notes 154–60 and accompanying text.  
 150. Hotfile, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1309. 
 151. Id. at 1309; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997).   
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 1309–10 (citing Costar and Cartoon Network).  
 154. Arista, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (addressing online bulletin boards on which users uploaded 
pirated content). 
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Megaupload court relied upon the case, whereas the Hotfile court expressly 
disagreed with it.  Usenet was an online network of groups of message and bulletin 
boards on which subscribers could read and post messages and content.155  The 
services were “overwhelmingly” used for copyright infringement.156 
Citing Cartoon Network, the Usenet defendants argued that the volitional 
element was lacking, but the court found volitional conduct sufficient to show 
Usenet was actively engaged in unlawful distribution of the copyrighted works and 
thus directly liable.157  Usenet was aware that the digital music files were among 
the most popular items on its site, and “took active measures” to exploit this:158  for 
example, although old content was automatically deleted, Usenet maintained 
servers with increased retention time that were specifically for storing music 
content.159  Additionally, Usenet exercised control, both “automated filtering and 
human review,” to reject certain content and users.  Such actions transformed the 
defendants “from passive providers of a space in which infringing activities 
happened to occur to active participants in the process of copyright infringement,” 
and their active engagement satisfied the volitional conduct requirement.160 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  PUBLIC PERFORMANCE REASONING 
As MP3tunes exemplifies, the Cartoon Network public performance reasoning 
will essentially protect digital storage lockers from successful public performance 
claims.  Assuming the user is listening to or watching the content stored in the 
locker in his own home (either alone or with no more than the normal circle of 
family and social acquaintances), the right holder would have to argue that it is a 
public performance under the transmit clause.  Yet because of the Second Circuit’s 
emphasis on the master copy/unique copy distinction, as long as the cyber locker 
stores a copy unique to that particular person or locker, it would not be a 
performance to the public. 
The application of Cartoon Network’s public performance reasoning in 
MP3tunes demonstrates the inherent flaws in forcing the master copy/unique copy 
distinction onto digital technologies.161  Deduplication might indeed be a standard, 
 
 155. Id. at 130.  Unlike cyber lockers, users could search for content on the Usenet system to 
download via a search feature or by the subjects and headers of the individual boards.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 131. 
 157. Id. at 147–49.  In its reasoning, the court relied heavily on the similarity of the facts at hand to 
the facts of Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997), in which another online bulletin 
board company was held directly liable for the infringing content on its site.  Id. at 512–14. 
 158. Arista, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148. 
 159. Id. at 131. 
 160. Id. at 148–49. 
 161. The Second Circuit even noted the lack of an explanation for the master copy reasoning in 
Redd Horne, and thus came up with its own justification.  Cartoon Network LP vs. CSC Holdings, Inc., 
536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Unfortunately, neither the Redd Horne court nor Prof. Nimmer 
explicitly explains why the use of a distinct copy affects the transmit clause inquiry . . . .”). 
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valuable storage-saving methodology, the use of which we would not want to deter 
through copyright law.162  But as it is described in MP3tunes, it simply does not 
accord with the court’s conclusion that the system saves unique copies, rather than 
master copies.  Moreover, the difference between whether a service utilizes a 
master copy or unique copies might depend on how a court understands the 
technical manner in which the service stores uploaded files on its servers. 
Furthermore, under the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the transmit clause, a 
cyber locker can avoid “publicly performing” by distributing the stored content 
through a download, rather than a streaming transmission.163  Not only is this 
inconsistent with the statutory text, but it is also counterintuitive, for rights holders 
are better protected against future infringement when content is delivered through a 
streaming transmission.  In a streaming transmission, as the service provider 
transmits the file, it temporarily stores buffer copies of portions of the file on the 
user’s computer.164  Once the audiovisual work is played, the buffer copy is 
automatically deleted, thus leaving no copies of the file on the user’s computer after 
the streaming transmission is concluded.165  If the content is sent via a download 
transmission, the user retains a copy of the file on her hard drive (and can 
potentially share it with whomever she wants).166  Therefore, the very nature of a 
streaming transmission enables service providers to minimize any unlawful sharing 
by a user. 
Significantly, most of the cyber locker sites on which infringement proliferates 
are those with a direct download link model, where users and third parties can only 
access the content stored in a locker by downloading it again.167  Delivery by 
download enables these sites to rack up profitable pages views because users can 
easily disseminate popular pirated content to an unlimited number of third parties.  
Accordingly, by the flawed transmit clause interpretation, the Second Circuit’s 
precedent favors a method of delivery that is the core of the problematic sites’ 
business model and incentivizes massive infringement. 
Ironically, Cablevision compared its remote DVR service to a virtual storage 
locker in its appellate brief: 
 
 162. Indeed, in a reply brief, MP3tunes claimed deduplication is protected by fair use because it 
facilitates users’ access to information stored in the cloud.  See MP3tunes’ Reply Brief to EMI’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 37–38, Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 25, 2010) (No. 07-9931).   
 163. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 164. See, e.g., Spektor, supra note 50, at 46–50 (2009) (describing the difference between 
streaming and download transmissions). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.; see also Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill the Podcasting Star?, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 161, 165 (2005) (describing how podcasts utilize an upload-download model, rather than a 
stream, such that once a user has downloaded a file, he has permanent control over that copy and could 
potentially distribute it further copies).   
 167. Although Megavideo.com, one of Megaupload’s partner sites, used a streaming format, 
viewers could also choose to download the video.  See Ellen Seidler, Cyberlockers:  Explaining Piracy’s 
Profit Pyramid, POP UP PIRATES (Dec. 15, 2011), http://popuppirates.com/?p=1249.  There are also 
numerous cyber locker sites that stream pirated audiovisual work.  Id. 
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The correct analogy for the RS-DVR is not [video-on-demand], but the “virtual 
locker” that allows users to store and retrieve their own files from a central server.  A 
virtual locker provider does not “publicly perform” a work merely because multiple 
users happen to store and retrieve their own copies of the same song . . . .168 
The analogy was likely a defensive strategy to distinguish the RS-DVR from video 
on demand and instead align it with the VCR, as time-shifting via VCR is protected 
by the Sony doctrine.  Somewhat presciently, the analogy forecasted how Cartoon 
Network’s public performance reasoning would largely shield cyber lockers from 
public performance liability. 
B.  WHAT CONSTITUTES VOLITIONAL CONDUCT? 
Despite holding that the reproduction by an automated system at the direction of 
the user does not constitute volitional conduct on the part of Cablevision, the 
Cartoon Network decision is not instructive as to what would constitute volitional 
conduct such as to hold the provider of an automated service directly liable.169  The 
varying volitional analyses in Megaupload, Hotfile and Arista elucidate the lack of 
clarity among district courts from different circuits.170  This subsection will 
examine some of the factors considered by the courts in the case law previously 
mentioned. 
Although the Copyright Act does not expressly require a human actor for direct 
liability,171 some courts appear to emphasize some degree of actual human 
involvement as nearly a prerequisite to finding volitional conduct in a claim against 
an automated service.  Several cyber locker cases analyzed more specifically 
whether the defendant company itself (i.e., its employees) uploaded infringing 
content.  For example, the Hotfile court distinguished the case at hand from the 
finding of volitional conduct in Russ Hardenburgh by noting that in the latter case, 
company employees uploaded the copyrighted content to the server.172  Similarly, 
 
 168. Reply Brief for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 44, Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1480), 2007 WL 6101594. 
 169. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 57–60, the Second Circuit believed the only 
volitional conduct of Cablevision was its design and maintenance of “a system that exists only to 
produce a copy,” but concluded that this conduct was not enough to render Cablevision directly liable 
for any unlawful reproduction that occurs on that system.  See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131.  Yet 
the court did not discuss whether a provider of an automated system, like Cablevision, could ever be 
directly liable as a result of the design and maintenance of a system existing solely to produce copies, or 
if there might be any other conduct by such a provider that would be considered volitional.  See 
generally id. at 131–32. 
 170. Not all circuits have embraced the volitional requirement.  For example, in Warner Bros. v. 
WTV Systems, a California district court declined to apply a volitional requirement absent express 
instruction from the Ninth Circuit.  See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc. (Zediva), 824 
F.Supp.2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
 171. See NIMMER, supra note 54, § 15.3 (“The Copyright Act does not specify that there must be a 
human actor involved for direct infringement.”) 
 172. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“But, as 
already explained, the defendant in Russ Hardenburgh committed a direct, volitional act by having its 
employees upload the copyrighted material to its server.”); see also id. at 1309 (“[I]n some of the cases 
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the MP3tunes court found a genuine issue of material fact about whether MP3tunes 
employees sideloaded EMI’s songs in the scope of their employment, and the court 
denied EMI summary judgment on the claim of direct liability.173  But the factor is 
not dispositive:  there was no plausible allegation that Megaupload itself directly 
uploaded any infringing content, and yet the Megaupload court still found 
sufficient volitional conduct to pass the motion to dismiss stage.174  Nonetheless, it 
appears to play a key role in the volitional conduct analysis. 
But without similar employee involvement, can a service provider ever be held 
directly liable for creating an automated service that enables or even induces 
infringement?  The Second Circuit suggested the question remained open:  “We 
need not decide today whether one’s contribution to the creation of an infringing 
copy may be so great that it warrants holding that party directly liable for the 
infringement, even though another party has actually made the copy.”175  In spite of 
this assertion, it is easy to read Cartoon Network as answering that question in the 
negative.  Then again, as the divergent outcomes in the factually similar Hotfile and 
Megaupload cases demonstrate, it is not clear how broadly or narrowly courts will 
construe the Cartoon Network holding.176  On the one hand, the Arista and 
Megaupload courts took a more flexible approach to the volitional element, finding 
the requisite volition from a totality of factors, such as awareness and exploitation 
of the use of its service for infringement as well as control over the infringement.177  
But the Hotfile opinion suggests that more is needed—perhaps a substantial, overt 
action. 178 
 
cited by the plaintiffs, rather than having users upload the copyrighted material, the defendant took a 
volitional act, i.e., uploading the copyrighted work itself or using software to search for material to 
upload.”)  As an example of the latter cases, the court referenced N.Y. Times v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 2381 
(2001), where the publisher “codes each article to facilitate computerized retrieval, then transmits it in a 
separate file” before it becomes part of LexisNexis’ database.  Hotfile, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.  Is this 
really that different than the automated system? 
 173. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 CIV. 9931(WHP), 2011 WL 3667335 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011), amended and superseded by 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Because a genuine dispute exists as to whether any of the 171 songs in question were downloaded by 
employees in the course of their employment, EMI’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is 
denied.”). 
 174. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11CV0191-IEG(BLM), 2011 WL 3203117, at *4 n.3 
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (“Perfect 10 does not plausibly allege Megaupload itself uploaded any Perfect 
10 materials.”). 
 175. Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008); 4 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.08[C]. 
 176. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Mixed DMCA Online Safe Harbor Ruling in Cloud-Based Music 
Locker Case, ERIC’S BLOG, 16 No. 8 Cyberspace Law 18 (Sept. 2011) (Westlaw). 
 177. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (listing several different acts by Megaupload that, considered together, evinced 
volitional conduct sufficient to hold Megaupload directly liable); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, 
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that defendants’ awareness that music 
files were the most popular items on their service, creation of servers dedicated solely to MP3 files, and 
control and filtering capabilities over the content on their servers altogether satisfied the volitional 
conduct requirement for direct infringement). 
 178. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1308 (S.D. Fla 2011) 
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In one regard, volition is present; the overt act of the service provider merely 
takes place at an earlier stage—the design and creation of the automated system.179  
The Second Circuit in Cartoon Network even acknowledged that this was volitional 
conduct; it just was not the volitional conduct that mattered.180  Presumably, the 
court was looking for something with a greater causal connection to the infringing 
act.  But when a system is purposely designed to automatically download, copy, 
play and display content upon a user’s command, without any nonautomated 
interaction with the service provider, it seems irrational to require human 
involvement after the system is up and running.181 
Furthermore, when a service provider induces or exploits the use of its 
automated system for infringement, it hardly seems reasonable to preclude direct 
liability simply on the automated nature of the system.182  For example, as the 
Arista court emphasized in finding that the defendants satisfied the volitional 
conduct requirement, Usenet was aware that the digital music files were among the 
most popular items on its site, and Usenet “took active measures” to exploit this.183  
Similarly, both the Hotfile and Megaupload opinions noted the defendants’ 
inducement of uploading; the Hotfile opinion even goes as far as to acknowledge 
explicitly that Hotfile encourages massive infringement.184  (The Megaupload court 
was a bit more tentative about this, describing merely that Megaupload encouraged 
users to upload popular media.)185  Yet a rigid adherence to the volitional analysis 
of Cartoon Network means that cyber lockers will most likely avoid direct 
liability.186  Despite Hotfile’s encouragement of massive infringement, the court 
rejected Disney’s claim that Hotfile could be held directly liable by creating a 
service that induced infringement.187 
As the Second Circuit treated it, the volitional element also fails to account for 
other differences that are arguably an important factor in determining liability.  For 
 
(acknowledging that Hotfile allegedly encouraged the  massive infringement but stating there was no 
allegations that Hotfile took “direct, volitional steps” to violate plaintiffs’ rights, such as an allegation 
that Hotfile itself uploaded copyrighted material). 
 179. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 54, § 15.3 (“To the extent that voluntary acts are required, they 
can often be found in the creation and deployment of a service or system, intending to and in fact 
encouraging its use for infringing acts.”). 
 180. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131. 
 181. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 54, § 15.3 (“Automation of a type intended to supplant or 
substitute for human conduct should be treated as equivalent to human conduct.”). 
 182. See, e.g., id. (finding it difficult to accept the argument that under copyright law, mere 
automation should “shift[] the entire focus of infringement liability”).  
 183. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 184. See supra notes 143, 178 and accompanying text.  
 185. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., 11CV0191-IEG BLM, 2011 WL 3203117, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (noting that Megaupload “encourages and, in some cases pays, its users to 
upload vast amounts of popular media through its Rewards Programs”). 
 186. One such example might be Hotfile.  See supra note 178.  
 187. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  The court 
also found that copies created by Hotfile once the content was uploaded to the server failed to establish 
volition because they too were created automatically.  Id. 
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example, shouldn’t the source of the copyrighted work matter?188  A service 
provider that both provides and stores a copy arguably acts with more volition than 
a service provider that merely stores a copy.  With digital storage lockers and 
Internet bulletin boards, the user provides the copy that he uploads or posts and that 
will be stored on the service provider’s server.189  In Cartoon Network, on the other 
hand, the copy was made by Cablevision and retained on Cablevision’s hard 
disks.190  Though MP3tunes users uploaded their own content, MP3tunes lent a 
helping hand through its Sideload subsidiary, which enabled users to search for free 
music files online and seamlessly sideload them into their storage lockers.191  Had 
MP3tunes lacked safe harbor protection under section 512, it is questionable 
whether the fact that MP3tunes enabled or assisted the user finding free (often 
unauthorized) songs on third party websites would have been enough to make the 
conduct volitional under the Second Circuit’s definition. 
The imposition of a volitional requirement on copyright infringement taking 
place over an automated system creates an even more fundamental problem for 
rights holders, however:  it could mean the difference between a case and no case at 
all.  A copyright owner who cannot pursue a direct infringement claim against a 
cyber locker—e.g., because of a lack of volition—might also be unable to assert a 
claim of secondary liability against the storage locker, for a secondary infringement 
claim must be based on direct infringement by another party.192  Additionally, a 
direct liability suit against the infringing user might not be feasible:  the right 
holder might be unable to identify the infringing user; the costs of litigating might 
outweigh the benefits if each user only engaged in one or two instances of 
infringement; or the user might be able to raise a fair use defense.  In these 
situations, rights holders would lack any legal redress at all.  But this is not at all in 
touch with the underlying policy concerns that led the Netcom court to impose a 
 
 188. See Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 15 (“By contrast, Cablevision’s own transmissions are the 
source of the copies the subscribers request.”).  In its appellate brief, Cablevision argued that the source 
is irrelevant.  Reply Brief for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 45, Cartoon Network L.P. v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-1511-cv(CON)), 2007 
WL 6101594 (“A virtual locker provider does not ‘publicly perform’ a work merely because multiple 
users happen to store and retrieve their own copies of the same song—even when . . . the same company 
also provides the content.”).  However, it does not appear that the Second Circuit discussed the source of 
the content in the opinion.  See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121. 
 189. See, e.g., Malkan, supra note 101, at 526–27 (“In the virtual locker, customers upload their 
copies to the locker.  The copy is stored there and played back on demand from wherever the customer 
is at the time.”). 
 190. See id. at 527 (“In the RS-DVR service, by contrast, the customer won’t upload anything to 
Cablevision.  The copy will be made by Cablevision at the customer’s request (perhaps lawfully, if Sony 
applies to this method of time-shifting) and retained by Cablevision for the customer’s subsequent 
access.”) (footnote omitted)); see also Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 15 (contrasting the passive conduit in 
Netcom, which merely conveyed copies from one subscriber to another, with Cablevision, which was the 
source of the copies the subscribers requested).  
 191. See supra note 113; section II.B. 
 192. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“For all three theories of secondary copyright infringement, there must be the direct infringement of a 
third party.”). 
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volitional requirement.  In fact, Netcom’s rejection of direct liability against the 
service providers was explicitly premised on the direct liability of the user: 
Where the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable for the same act, it does not 
make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose 
role in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is 
necessary for the functioning of the Internet.  Such a result is unnecessary as there is 
already a party directly liable . . . .193 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s imposition of a volitional requirement 
inaccurately reflects the Netcom court’s justifications for the same, and it 
inadequately protects the rights of copyright holders. 
C.  CARTOON NETWORK AND THE DMCA 
Cartoon Network’s volitional and public performance reasoning has even 
greater implications for cyber lockers than it did for Cablevision:  as Internet 
service providers who store material at the direction of users, cyber lockers are 
likely to seek safe harbor under the DMCA—an option that is not available to cable 
providers.194  Limited to the cable TV context, perhaps the Second Circuit correctly 
decided Cartoon Network; there were certainly policy reasons and judicial 
considerations in favor of protecting cable providers by imposing a volitional 
requirement.195 
But in the context of Internet service providers, to which Cartoon Network has 
been applied, the Cartoon Network decision lacks similar policy justifications 
because digital service providers already have substantial protection from the 
DMCA.196  MP3tunes serves as an apt example:  because the cyber locker fulfilled 
its minimal obligations under the DMCA, it was largely protected from monetary 
damages.  Even with regard to those songs it failed to remove (and, thus, for which 
it lacked safe harbor protection), MP3tunes nevertheless has a strong defense 
against liability because of Cartoon Network.  Now, following this Second Circuit 
precedent, MP3tunes can argue that its system stored unique copies of songs and 
that any copying was done by an automated system at the direction of a user; thus, 
MP3tunes can argue that any copying was nonvolitional. 
As MP3tunes suggests, cyber locker providers have a strong incentive to set up 
automated systems without indexing the content and to let users find and choose 
 
 193. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 194. Provided that the cyber lockers meet the prerequisites for safe harbor set forth in section 512, 
such as developing a repeat infringer policy.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 195. For example, the Second Circuit may have felt it was treading too closely to the Supreme 
Court’s “Betamax” decision, given that the RS-DVR was viewed by many as a logical outgrowth of the 
VCR.  
 196. Section 512 provides valuable limitations on copyright liability for qualifying service 
providers that comply with the threshold requirements:  as long as a service provider responds to a 
notice of infringement and removes the infringing content expeditiously, it will incur neither direct nor 
derivative liability for monetary damages.  See Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 186.  
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what content to upload without any assistance.197  Unsurprisingly, virtually all 
direct download link cyber lockers have those features in common.  But might a 
court find that by merely assuming users are uploading legally obtained files, such 
cyber lockers are willfully blinding themselves to the infringement on their sites?  
In another copyright infringement suit against Hotfile, plaintiff Liberty Media made 
this very argument:  “Hotfile cleverly avoids cataloging or indexing the files in 
order to be willfully blind to their users’ uploads and downloads.”198  In a similar 
vein, the defendant in In re Aimster attempted to use the structure of the file-
swapping program as a shield.199  Focusing on language from Sony, the Aimster 
defendant argued that he lacked the requisite knowledge for contributory 
infringement because the encrypted nature of the service prevented him from 
knowing what songs users were copying through the service.200  But the Seventh 
Circuit rejected such a defense, stating that in copyright law “willful blindness is 
knowledge.”201  According to the court, one who is aware of “shady dealings” yet 
takes steps to avoid acquiring full knowledge of the nature and extent of those 
dealings is “held to have a criminal intent.”202 
Yet the Second Circuit’s approach in a 2012 opinion suggests the court may be 
less inclined than the Seventh Circuit to entertain a willful blindness argument in 
this context.  In Viacom v. YouTube, the Second Circuit questioned whether a 
willful blindness argument was even possible—specifically, whether the DMCA 
abrogated the common law principle of willful blindness.203  Pointing to section 
512(m), the court noted that safe harbor protection could not be conditioned on any 
affirmative duty to monitor, but also acknowledged that willful blindness could not 
be defined as an affirmative duty to monitor.204  Finding neither section 512(m) nor 
the rest of the DMCA spoke directly to willful blindness, the court concluded that 
the DMCA did not abrogate the doctrine of willful blindness, and thus the doctrine 
may be applied where appropriate to demonstrate “knowledge or awareness of 
specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.”205  Notwithstanding the 
conclusion, the methodology itself hints at some implicit resistance to a willful 
blindness argument:  for example, the Seventh Circuit in Aimster did not question 
 
 197. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (regarding the MP3tunes court’s statement 
that “[a]bsent adequate notice, MP3tunes would need to conduct a burdensome investigation in order to 
determine whether songs in its users’ accounts were unauthorized copies”); see also supra Part II.B 
(discussing a counterfactual in which MP3tunes did not operate Sideload.com). 
 198. Complaint at 7, Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Hotfile Corp., No. 1:11CV20056 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 161734.  The case ultimately settled in May without a decision from the court. 
 199. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 204. Id.  As defined by the Second Circuit, “[a] person is ‘willfully blind’ or engages in ‘conscious 
avoidance’ amounting to knowledge where the person was aware of a high probability of the fact in 
dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”  Id. at 38 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 205. Id. at 35. 
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whether the doctrine might be foreclosed.206  Furthermore, Second Circuit 
precedent suggests a high bar for a willful blindness challenge to succeed in a 
similar context.207 
Even if courts disagree that a cyber locker could be held liable simply because 
of purposeful choices in structuring its service, they must deny safe harbor to cyber 
lockers that turn a blind eye to clear signs of infringement.  To remain eligible for 
safe harbor protection under section 512(c), service providers have an affirmative 
obligation to remove or disable access to infringing material upon gaining actual 
knowledge of infringement or in the presence of “red flags”—i.e., under “facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”208  By their very 
business model, one might argue that many direct download link providers 
regularly ignore a red flag:  disproportionately voluminous, predominately single-
time-viewing page views of a particular URL.209  Unless these service providers 
promptly act to cut off access to these files, they should not be able to avail 
themselves of the safe harbor.210 
Under current judicial practice, however, it is not certain that courts will 
foreclose a safe harbor defense because of such indicators of piracy.211  Copyright 
academics, such as Professor Jane Ginsburg, have noted that courts tend to conflate 
the actual knowledge and red flag provisions by requiring too high a degree of 
specificity for there to be a red flag that would require action by the service 
provider.212  Recently, the Second Circuit denied such misinterpretation and 
explained that the difference between actual and red flag knowledge is not a matter 
of specific or generalized knowledge, but, rather, a matter of a subjective or 
objective standard.213  In the Second Circuit’s view, both provisions apply only to 
specific instances of infringement.214  This interpretation strains the text of the 
 
 206. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643. 
 207. In Tiffany v. eBay, the Second Circuit rejected a willful blindness challenge and held that even 
though eBay “knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products were listed and sold through its 
website,” such knowledge was insufficient to trigger liability.  600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010).  Later, 
in its Viacom opinion, the court rationalized that the conclusion in Tiffany was based on “the extensive 
findings of the district court with respect to willful blindness,” presumably to bolster its suggestion that 
a willful blindness challenge could potentially succeed.  Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 n.10.  
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
 209. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 191 (listing disproportionately high web traffic as one 
example that could, or at least should, constitute a red flag).   
 210. Megaupload had not yet raised a DMCA defense at the time during which the district court 
for the Southern District of California denied the motion to dismiss. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload 
Ltd., No. 11CV0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 3203117 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011). 
 211. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 190 (“The case law interpreting the statutory ‘red flag’ 
standard suggests the flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before the service provider’s 
obligation to intervene comes into play.”)   
 212. Id.  
 213. See Viacom, 676 F.3d 19 at 30–32.  The court explained that “the actual knowledge provision 
turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, while the red flag 
provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the 
specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”  Id. at 31.   
 214. Id.  
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DMCA, which distinguishes between the two provisions with language about 
specificity of knowledge:  “(i) does not have actual knowledge . . . ; (ii) in the 
absence of actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent . . . .”215  But whether it is a misinterpretation or not, 
the prevailing judicial construction of the red flag provision sets a high bar for the 
type of knowledge that would trigger a service provider’s take-down obligations.  
Consequently, and as was demonstrated in MP3tunes,216 cyber locker providers 
have an easier time keeping their safe harbor protection.  There is yet another 
potential problem with transporting the Cartoon Network volitional reasoning to 
service providers who are eligible for safe harbor:  it is questionable if, after the 
enactment of the DMCA, a volitional requirement is ever appropriate for Internet 
storage providers like cyber lockers.  Only two of the four safe harbors, 
transmitting and caching, contain the language “carried out through an automatic 
technological process.”217  Reading this as a deliberate Congressional choice, 
Professor Nimmer argues that courts should only apply the Netcom volitional 
requirement in the case of transmitting and caching because those provisions 
“codify that element by requiring that something beyond an ‘automatic technical 
process’ be implicated.”218  Accordingly, Netcom’s volitional factor is 
inappropriate for the other two safe harbors, storing and linking.219  If Professor 
Nimmer is correct, courts should not require volitional conduct to support a claim 
of direct liability for cyber lockers, which presumably store information at the 
direction of a user. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The problem with the reasoning in Cartoon Network is that in its public 
performance and volitional analyses, it reached for analogies and case law that fit 
uncomfortably with our present technological era.  Not only is the Second Circuit’s 
reading of the transmit clause in tension with the statutory text, its copy shop 
analogy is outdated, given that so many modern services and technologies are 
purposely designed to be completely automated or at the direction of a user.220  The 
 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  The court’s settlement on a distinction 
out of line with the plain language of the DMCA is less surprising when the starting point is considered:  
the Second Circuit looked first to the judicial usage of “actual knowledge” and “facts or circumstances” 
in cases completely unrelated to copyright.  See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31 (citing United States v. 
Quinones, 635 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 2011), and Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
 216. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Undoubtedly, MP3tunes is aware that some level of infringement occurs.  But, there is no genuine 
dispute that MP3tunes did not have specific ‘red flag’ knowledge with respect to any particular 
link . . . .”).  Indeed, the Second Circuit cited MP3tunes as an example that its interpretation of section 
512(c) was correct.  See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32. 
 217. 17 U.S.C. § 512; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12B.06[B][2][c][i]. 
 218. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12B.06[B][2][b]. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 54, § 15.3 (“Modern technology enables automation of many 
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distinction between master copies and unique copies may be suitable for physical 
chattels, but, as seen in MP3tunes, it does not translate well to the manner in which 
digital files are stored over the Internet.  Moreover, literal adherence to the 
master/unique copy reasoning would arguably preclude the use of innovative and 
efficient storage-saving processes like deduplication.  The application of the master 
copy/unique copy distinction in MP3tunes suggests that the Cartoon Network 
reasoning will greatly shield digital storage lockers from liability, provided they 
comply with their obligations under section 512. 
With its volitional reasoning, Cartoon Network clings to a concept that is out of 
touch with our present technological age.  Netcom’s volitional requirement—
motivated by a concern that the entire Internet could be held liable for the act of a 
single user—may have made sense in 1995.221  Today, however, service providers 
already have adequate protection:  the limitations on liability available through 
section 512.  Given that automated services are increasingly the norm, the Second 
Circuit’s holding that reproduction by an automated system is nonvolitional thus 
goes too far.222  Furthermore, the automated nature of a system does not necessarily 
mean the service provider is unaware or impassive about infringement taking place; 
indeed, the Hotfile, Megaupload and Arista opinions all noted some knowledge that 
the services were used for infringement, along with a certain degree of inducement.  
Finally, the volitional conduct analyses (or lack thereof) in the case law surveyed in 
this Note demonstrate how unsettled the law is regarding a volitional requirement:  
whether it is actually a required element; if it still applies after the enactment of 
section 512; and exactly what constitutes volitional conduct when the system is 
automated. 
More troublesome, however, is the impact that Cartoon Network will have on 
digital storage lockers.  As MP3tunes implies, Cartoon Network essentially sets up 
a roadmap for avoiding direct liability.223  To avoid volition that will render a 
provider directly liable:  make the entire system completely automatic, so copying, 
transmitting and playing content are solely upon the command of a user.  To avoid 
successful public performance claims:  maintain unique copies of content for each 
user.  To easily satisfy safe harbor requirements:  avoid tracking the sources of 
user-uploaded content or the content itself.  MP3tunes thus demonstrates just how 
beneficial the Cartoon Network reasoning can be for cyber lockers. 
In combination, the Cartoon Network reasoning and the availability of claiming 
safe harbor could substantially shield cyber lockers from any copyright liability 
occurring through their sites, at least in the Second Circuit.  More needs to be done 
for rights holders, who may consequently lack any legal redress at all. 
The best hope is that other circuits refuse to follow the Second Circuit’s lead in 
Cartoon Network—or at least treat automation of a type intended to supplant or 
 
functions that once required direct human involvement.”). 
 221. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that Netcom reached the proper result in its particular context). 
 222. Id.; see also supra note 220. 
 223. See Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 27 (noting the Second Circuit’s subsequent limitation in light 
of the “potential onslaught of new copyright-avoiding business models that its decision might inspire”). 
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substitute for human conduct as the equivalent of human conduct.224  Of course, 
this could create a more serious problem:  too high a cost of operation for valuable 
services, like search engines.  Additionally, the safe harbors might still 
substantially shield cyber lockers from liability, at least given the current manner in 
which courts construe the red flag provision in section 512(c). 
A legislative intervention would certainly be the most effective solution, but is 
the least likely to occur.225  Ironically, the two main changes proposed in the 
(ultimately unenacted) Stop Online Piracy Act, increased criminal penalties and 
methods to cut off financial support, might actually make a substantial difference in 
fighting piracy.  After U.S. prosecutors shut down Megaupload, former 
Megaupload users flocked to different cyber locker sites, such as Rapidgator, 
whose web traffic increased exponentially.226  Yet, when PayPal announced it was 
ending service to RapidGator customers, RapidGator announced it would close.227  
But the current range of criminal penalties does not adequately deter all would-be 
infringers, and we have yet to see other payment providers voluntarily cut off 
access like PayPal has. 
Another possibility is to require structural changes to minimize the use of cyber 
locker services for infringing purposes.  Congress could impose an obligation to 
make a reasonable and technologically feasible effort to monitor for 
infringement.228  For example, cyber lockers could utilize content identification 
software like Vobile’s vCloud9 technology, which scans uncompressed and 
“difficult-to-scan” compressed files and then compares data to its registry of 
copyrighted audiovisual works.229  A data match triggers (quite appropriately) an 
automated action, chosen by the content owner, such as a complete removal of the 
content from the website.230  But this could go too far and curb what are actually 
fair uses of cyber lockers, for content identification software does not discern 
whether the copy was legally purchased.  Another possibility would be to limit the 
 
 224. See NIMMER, supra note 54, § 15.3. 
 225. Given the enormous controversy generated by the recent proposed antipiracy legislation, the 
Stop Online Piracy Act, and the strong coalition that emerged to block its passage and protect Internet 
freedom, it looks like it will be a while before a substantive Internet antipiracy bill is passed. 
 226. Cyber locker site RapidGator saw its web traffic increase from a few hundred visits to over 
100,000 per day.  See Ernesto, Cyberlocker to Shut down After PayPal Ban, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 26, 
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/cyberlocker-to-shut-down-after-paypal-ban-120226/. 
 227. Id. 
 228. This language was inspired by language from that of the aforementioned proposed antipiracy 
legislation. 
 229. Vobile Expands Copyright Infringement Technology, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:31 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2011/12/08/vobile-expands-copyright-infringement-technology/. 
 230. Id.  In 2008, a German court chose a similar solution as part of the remedy for a cyber 
locker’s copyright infringement.  See Caitlin Cimpanu, Rapidshare Loses Lawsuit, Will Filter Some 
Book Titles, SOFTPEDIA (Feb. 26, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://news.softpedia.com/news/Rapidshare-Loses-
Lawsuit-Will-Filter-Some-Book-Titles-136125.shtml.  On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed 
the earlier judgment and deemed the mandated remedies to be ineffective; content scanning, for one, 
would simply lead to encrypted files.  See Nate Anderson, Court:  RapidShare Doesn’t Need to Filter 
User Uploads, ARS TECHNICA (May 4, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/05/court-
rapidshare-doesnt-need-to-filter-uploads.ars. 
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upload capability so that cyber lockers only store content purchased from an 
affiliate digital store.  Yet this vastly reduces the utility of cyber lockers, and locker 
providers are unlikely to take this action voluntarily. 
Perhaps a better solution would be to focus structural changes on the retrieval of 
the content from the locker.  Because a streaming transmission does not leave a 
permanent copy on the hard drive after it is played, this mode of redelivery helps 
curb subsequent infringement.  Notably, this is one step that some legitimate cyber 
locker services have taken, such as Apple’s iTunes Match.  Streaming, however, 
also has practical downfalls, such as requiring a live Internet connection for the 
duration of the performance.  Additionally, streaming itself only limits subsequent 
infringement by the recipient, but it is not necessarily legitimate itself:  there is a 
growth of rogue sites which transmit pirated works through streaming feeds.  For 
sites that deliver stored files by download transmissions, piracy could also be 
reduced through limits on file size and the number of times a single file can be 
downloaded.231 
Whether the Cartoon Network decision will continue to impact cyber locker 
lawsuits outside of the Second Circuit remains an open question.  With 
Megaupload’s recent criminal indictment, the MPAA plaintiffs in the Hotfile 
litigation have moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hotfile’s business 
model is “virtually indistinguishable” from that of Megaupload.232  The Florida 
district court could again rely on the volitional element from Cartoon Network and 
find the one-click file host cannot be held directly liable.  One hopes, however, that 
the court recognizes the extent to which the one-click host model of cyber lockers 
profits from and incites massive infringement through its services—and that the 
court finally holds such providers accountable. 
 
 
 231. For example, one reason Megaupload consumed so much bandwidth is because of the large 
size of many files that were stored and shared on its systems, including movie trailers, software 
applications and games. See, e.g., Brodkin, supra note 66.  Dropbox, in comparison, also has high traffic 
but the files shared are smaller in size, which suggests a mix of work and personal files.  Id.  
 232. See Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment at 10, 
Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2012) (Doc. No. 322). 
